We study the house allocation with existing tenants model (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1999) and consider rules that allocate houses based on priorities. We introduce a new acyclicity requirement and show that for house allocation with existing tenants a top trading cycles (TTC ) rule is consistent if and only if its underlying priority structure satisfies our acyclicity condition. Next we give an alternative description of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities in terms of two specific rules, YRMH-IGYT (you request my house -I get your turn) and efficient priority rules, that are applied in two steps. Moreover, even if no priority structure is a priori given, we show that a rule is a top trading cycles rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities if and only if it satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategyproofness, consistency, and either reallocation-proofness or non-bossiness.
Introduction
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over the objects and objects possibly have priorities for the agents. This problem occurs in many applications, e.g., for school choice, the allocation of social or university housing to tenants, or kidney exchange. In many applications, some of the agents additionally have existing claims for an object that have to be respected. When allocating social housing, there might be existing tenants that already occupy a housing unit, but may want to switch if they can obtain a unit that they prefer, while new applicants have to be newly assigned to a vacant unit. When assigning teachers to jobs (Combe et al., 2018) , employed teachers may have the option to be reassigned to a new job, while new teachers have to be assigned to their first job. In many school choice districts students have a right to attend a neighborhood school that has to be respected in the assignment.
These situations are captured by the model of house allocation problems with existing tenants which is introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) : A finite set of houses has to be allocated to a finite set of agents without using monetary transfers. Each agent is either a tenant who occupies a house or an applicant, and each house is either occupied or vacant. Furthermore, each agent has strict preferences over all houses and the so-called null house (or outside option). An outcome for a house allocation problem with existing tenants is a matching that assigns to each agent either a real house or his outside option, such that no real house is assigned to more than one agent. A rule selects a matching for each house allocation problem with existing tenants.
The model of house allocation problems with existing tenants is a hybrid of two models, housing markets and house allocation problems. A house allocation problem with existing tenants reduces to a housing market (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) if there are no applicants and no vacant houses, i.e., all agents are tenants and all houses are occupied. A house allocation problem with existing tenants reduces to a house allocation problem (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979) if there are no tenants and no occupied houses, i.e., all agents are applicants and all houses are vacant.
Ideally, any rule used in practice to allocate indivisible objects, with or without existing claims, would be efficient, strategically robust and fair. In the case of housing markets, efficiency in the form of Pareto optimality, 1 strategical robustness in the form of strategyproofness 2 , and fairness in the limited sense that existing rights are respected, can be achieved by the top-trading cycles rule (Ma, 1994; Roth, 1982) . However, for more general settings and for fairness in the stronger sense of no justified envy (or stability), 3 no rule satisfying all three desiderata exists (Ergin, 2002) . Since no ideal allocation rule exists, it is important to study the trade-offs of the various properties that represent efficiency, fairness, and strategic robustness. This research agenda uses the axiomatic method (see Thomson, 2001) to understand the various normative trade-offs when implementing certain types of rules 1 A rule is Pareto-optimal if the matching chosen by the rule is such that there is no other matching that makes some agents better off without hurting the others.
2 A rule is strategy-proof if no agent can ever benefit by misrepresenting his preferences unilaterally. 3 A matching eliminates justified envy if whenever an agent prefers another agent's match to his own, he has a lower priority than the other agent for that house. Existing rights of tenants are incorporated by giving each tenant top priority at the house that he occupies. A matching is stable if it eliminates justified envy, is individually-rational, and non-wasteful (see Balinski and Sönmez, 1999) .
instead of others. To place our paper within this research agenda, we would like to refer to the characterizations of deferred acceptance mechanisms Klaus, 2014, 2016; Kojima and Manea, 2010) and immediate acceptance mechanisms (Dogan and Klaus, 2018; Kojima andÜnver, 2014) : in all those characterizations the priorities (or more generally, choice functions) are obtained together with the rule using a set of normative criteria that reflect our desiderata. Similar characterizations for top trading cycles rules, without exogenously fixed priorities, have not been established yet. We are interested in completing the research agenda of a full normative understanding of standard house allocation and school choice rules. To this end, in this paper, we study rules that allocate houses to agents for house allocation problems with existing tenants with a particular focus on top trading cycles (TTC) rules.
Next, we survey the state of the art of the axiomatic approach for housing market, house allocation, and house allocation with existing tenants problems. Then, we formulate the exact research question we tackle in this paper and explain our results against the background of the literature.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to studies that consider not only house allocation problems with existing tenants but also housing markets and house allocation problems. We first look at some key results for housing markets and house allocation problems.
An important question that emerged in both the literature on housing markets as well as house allocation problems is the characterization of rules that allocate houses in a Paretooptimal and strategy-proof way. For housing markets, Roth and Postlewaite (1977, Theorem 2') showed that the core of a housing market 4 is unique and it is the outcome of the top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm.
5 Roth (1982) showed that the core/TTC rule is strategy-proof, and Bird (1984) showed that it is also group strategy-proof. 6 Ma (1994, Theorem 1) characterized the core/TTC rule of a housing market by Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality (for tenants), 7 and strategy-proofness; see also Sönmez (1999, Corollary 3) and Svensson (1999, Theorem 2) .
For house allocation problems, Svensson (1999, Theorem 1) showed that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, non-bossiness 8 , and neutrality 9 if and only if it is a simple serial 4 A matching for a housing market is in the core (or core stable) if no subset of agents exists such that some of them strictly benefit by reallocating their occupied houses among themselves, without hurting other agents in the group. 5 The TTC algorithm was defined in Shapley and Scarf (1974) and attributed to David Gale. 6 A rule is group strategy-proof if no group of agents can ever benefit by misrepresenting their preferences. 7 A rule for housing markets satisfies individual-rationality (for tenants) if no agent is assigned a house that is worse for him than his occupied house.
8 A rule satisfies non-bossiness if an agent by changing his preferences gets the same allocation under the rule, then the change in his preferences does not affect the allocation of other agents, and therefore the allocation of each agent by the rule remains the same.
9 A rule for house allocation problems is neutral if the matching selected by the rule is independent of dictatorship rule. 10 The following two research contributions show what can happen when neutrality is dropped in house allocation problems. Pápai (2000) introduced hierarchical exchange rules: hierarchical exchange rules extend the way TTC rules work by specifying ownership rights for the houses in an iterative hierarchical manner and by allowing for associated iterative top trades. Pápai (2000) showed that a rule for house allocation problems satisfies Pareto-optimality, strategy-proofness, nonbossiness, and reallocation-proofness 11 if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule. 12 Pycia andÜnver (2017, Theorem 1) extended this result by providing a full characterization of the class of Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and non-bossy rules, called trading cycles (TC) rules. The set of TC rules extends the set of hierarchical exchange rules by allowing agents to not only own houses throughout the iterative trading cycles allocation procedure but to also have a different "control right" called "brokerage" (a broker cannot necessarily consume a brokered house directly himself but he can trade it for another house he desires).
Another important precursor of our study is the work of Sönmez andÜnver (2010) on YRMH-IGYT (you request my house -I get your turn) rules introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) . Sönmez andÜnver (2010, Theorem 1) showed that a rule for house allocation problems with existing tenants satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, weak neutrality, 13 and consistency if and only if it is a YRMH-IGYT rule. YRMH-IGYT rules are essentially simple serial dictatorship rules that adapt to the ownership rights of tenants. Therefore, one question that motivated our work was what rules emerge for house allocation problems with existing tenants when dropping weak neutrality.
For house allocation problems, if consistency
14 is considered in addition to Paretooptimality and (group) strategy-proofness, then rules based on acyclic priorities become focal. For house allocation with quotas problems, which reduce to house allocation problems when the quota of each house is one, Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006) studied allocation rules and their properties in relation to (acyclic) priorities. Ergin (2002, Theorem 1) showed that for the agents-proposing deferred acceptance rule (Gale and Shapley, 1962 ) based on a priority structure π, denoted by DA π , the following are equivalent: DA π is Pareto-optimal, the names of the houses. 10 A simple serial dictatorship determines a matching based on an exogenously given ordering of the agents such that the first agent chooses his favorite house, the second agents chooses his favorite house among those that remain, etc.
11 A rule for house allocation problems is reallocation-proof if there do not exist two agents who gain by first misreporting their preferences and then swapping their assigned houses, such that neither of the two agents can change his assignment by misreporting alone.
12 A rule satisfies strategy-proofness and non-bossiness if and only if it satisfies group strategy-proofness (Pápai, 2000) .
13 A rule for house allocation problems with existing tenants is weakly neutral if it is independent of the names of the vacant houses.
14 A rule for house allocation problems is consistent if the following holds: suppose that after houses are allocated according to the rule, some agents leave the house allocation problem with their assigned houses. Then, if the remaining agents were to allocate the remaining houses according to the rule, each of them would receive the same house.
DA
π is group strategy-proof, DA π is consistent, and π is Ergin acyclic. Kesten (2006, Theorems 1 and 2) strengthened Ergin's acyclicity condition in two ways and showed that the TTC rule based on the priority structure is the agents-proposing deferred acceptance rule based on the priority structure if and only if the priority structure is Kesten acyclic, and the TTC rule based on the priority structure is consistent if and only if the priority structure is strongly Kesten acyclic. Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006) use different notions of acyclicity that coincide for house allocation problems. Furthermore, in their studies the priority structure is exogenously given. However, the class of TTC rules based on priority structures is a subclass of the hierarchical exchange rules studied by Pápai (2000) . Hence, under group strategy-proofness and reallocation-proofness, priorities can endogenously arise. This is also the case under consistency; Ehlers and Klaus (2006, Proposition 2 and Theorem 1) characterized efficient priority rules 15 for house allocation problems by Pareto-optimality, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency.
16 Ehlers and Klaus (2007) and Velez (2014) characterize a slightly larger class of rules by weakening the characterizing properties either to consistency (Ehlers and Klaus, 2006) or to versions of Pareto-optimality and consistency that pertain to two agent (reduced) problems only. Ergin's (2000, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1) results imply that a rule for house allocation problems satisfies Pareto-optimality, neutrality, and consistency if and only if it is a simple serial dictatorship rule (he uses somewhat weaker properties to show his result). Table 1 summarizes the properties of various house allocation rules that we have just reviewed (some of them characterize the respective rules).
Our Paper
Motivated by these previous works, we extend the analysis of Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and consistent rules to the more general model of house allocation with existing tenants. We observe that in house allocation problems with and without exiting tenants, requiring (weak) neutrality together with these properties results in simple serial dictatorship rules (here we interpret the YRMH-IGYT rules as ownership adapted simple serial dictatorship rules). We explore what happens when (weak) neutrality is dropped.
First, we extend the notion of (Ergin/Kesten) acyclicity to house allocation problems with existing tenants and show that a TTC rule based on ownership-adapted priorities 17 is consistent 18 if and only if the priority structure is acyclic (Theorem 1). Moreover, a TTC rule 15 A rule is an efficient priority rule if it is an agents-proposing deferred acceptance rule based on an Ergin acyclic priority structure.
16 A rule for house allocation problems is reallocation-consistent if the following holds: suppose that after houses are allocated according to the rule some agents are removed from the problem with their assigned houses, then, if these removed agents were to allocate their assigned houses (the removed houses) among themselves according to the rule, each of them would receive the same house.
17 Priorities are ownership-adapted if each tenant has top priority at his occupied house. 18 A rule for house allocation problems with existing tenants is consistent if the following holds: suppose that after houses are allocated according to the rule we remove some agents with their assignments and some unassigned houses from the problem in a way that the reduced problem contains the occupied houses of all House allocation rules PO IR SP NB RP RCON NEU simple serial dictatorship efficient priority hierarchical exchange trading cycles Notation: PO stands for Pareto-optimality, IR stands for individual-rationality, SP stands for strategy-proofness, NB stands for non-bossiness, RP stands for reallocation-proofness, RCON stands for reallocation-consistency, and NEU stands for neutrality. based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities can be interpreted as a two-step rule where the first rule is an almost YRMH-IGYT rule and the second rule is an efficient priority rule of Ehlers and Klaus (2006) 
(Proposition 2).
For house allocation problems consistency implies non-bossiness and hence the set of rules satisfying Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, and consistency is a (strict) subset of the trading cycles (TC) rules defined and characterized by Pycia and Unver (2017) . However, for house allocation problems with existing tenants consistency does not imply non-bossiness and we show that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, and consistency is neither a sub-nor a superset of Pycia andÜnver's trading cycles rules (Example 6). However, by adding either reallocationproofness (Theorem 2) or non-bossiness (Theorem 3), we reduce the class of rules to the set of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities.
One small but important difference between the model considered by Svensson (1999) , Pápai (2000) , Velez (2014) , and Pycia andÜnver (2017) and our model, apart from the presence of tenants, lies in how the "not receiving a house" or outside option is treated. In our model the outside option can be freely ranked by agents and hence they can divide the set of houses into acceptable and unacceptable houses while in the previously mentioned papers all houses are acceptable, i.e., the outside option is ranked last by default. Due to this difference one has to be careful when comparing results for these models. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the house allocation with existing tenants model and basic properties of rules. In Section 3 we introduce priority structures and TTC rules, and show that a TTC rule based on ownership-adapted priorities satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, group strategy-proofness, and reallocationproofness (Proposition 1). Furthermore, in Subsection 3.1 we show that a TTC rule based on ownership-adapted priorities is consistent if and only if the priority structure is acyclic (Theorem 1). We also show (Subsection 3.2) that any TTC rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities can be described as a two-step rule where the first rule is an almost YRMH-IGYT rule and the second rule is an efficient priority rule (Proposition 2). In Section 4 we first demonstrate that Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, and consistency neither imply reallocation-proofness nor non-bossiness (Example 6). Then, we state and prove our characterizations of TTC rules that are based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities by Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, and either reallocation-proofness (Theorem 2) or non-bossiness (Theorem 3).
were to allocate the remaining houses according to the rule, each of them would receive the same house.
House Allocation with Existing Tenants and Basic Properties
We mostly follow Sönmez andÜnver (2010) in this section. Let I be a finite set of potential agents and H be a finite set of potential houses. We assume that |I| ≥ 3 and |H| ≥ 2. Let h 0 denote the null house. We interpret the null house as the outside option of an agent if he does not receive any house. We fix a global ownership structure h : I → H ∪ {h 0 }. An agent i ∈ I is either a tenant, i.e., he already occupies a house h(i) ∈ H, or an applicant, i.e., h(i) = h 0 . No two agents can occupy the same house in H, i.e., for each i, j ∈ I with h(i) = h(j) = h 0 we have i = j. Let I T denote the set of potential tenants and I A the set of potential applicants; the set of potential agents I is partitioned into the sets I T and I A .
19
For each agent i ∈ I and set of houses H ⊆ H, let R(i, H) denote the set of all linear orders over H ∪ {h 0 }. 20 For each agent i ∈ I, we interpret R i ∈ R(i, H) as agent i's (strict) preferences over houses in H and the null house h 0 ; e.g., for h, h , h ∈ H, [R i :
. .] means that agent i would first like to have house h, then to have h , and then i would prefer to have the null house h 0 rather than house h , etc. An agent i ∈ I finds a house h ∈ H acceptable if h P i h 0 . We assume that every tenant i ∈ I T finds the house that he already occupies acceptable, i.e., h(i) P i h 0 . Hence, for tenants the set of preferences R(i, H) is smaller than for applicants. Let R(I, H) denote the set of all preference profiles over H ∪ {h 0 } for agents in I, i.e., R(I, H) = i∈I R(i, H).
Given R ∈ R(I, H) and I ⊆ I, let R I denote the preference profile (R i ) i∈ I ; it is the restriction of R to the set of agents I. We also use the notation R − I = R I\ I and
A house allocation problem with existing tenants is a list (I, H, R), where (i) I ⊆ I is a finite set of agents, (ii) H ⊆ H is a finite set of houses such that for each tenant i ∈ I ∩ I T , h(i) ∈ H, and (iii) R = (R i ) i∈I ∈ R(I, H) is a preference profile.
Note that by (ii), if a tenant is present, then so is the house he occupies. Throughout the paper we will consider the domain of all house allocation problems with existing tenants (as introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1999) . We will abbreviate the term house allocation problem with existing tenants simply as problem.
19 In contrast to Sönmez andÜnver (2010) we do not require that there exists at least one house that is not occupied by a potential tenant, i.e., we do not require |H| > |I T |. 20 A linear order over H ∪ {h 0 } is a binary relation R that is antisymmetric (for each h, h ∈ H ∪ {h 0 }, if h R h and h R h, then h = h ), transitive (for each h, h , h ∈ H ∪ {h 0 }, if h R h and h R h , then h R h ), and complete (for each h, h ∈ H ∪ {h 0 }, h R h or h R h). By P we denote the asymmetric part of R. Hence, given h, h ∈ H ∪ {h 0 }, h P h means that h is strictly preferred to h ; h R h means that h P h or h = h and that h is weakly preferred to h .
Given a problem (I, H, R), I T = I T ∩ I denotes the set of tenants, I A = I \ I T = I A ∩ I denotes the set of applicants, H O = {h(i)} i∈I T denotes the set of occupied houses, and
A problem is called a problem with only applicants when there are no tenants and hence no occupied houses, i.e., I T = ∅ and H O = ∅. A problem with only applicants is traditionally called a house allocation problem (house allocation problems were first analyzed in Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979) .
A problem is called a problem with only tenants when there are no applicants and no vacant houses, i.e., I A = ∅ and H V = ∅. A problem with only tenants is traditionally called a housing market (housing markets were first introduced by Shapley and Scarf, 1974) .
A matching for a problem (I, H, R) is a function µ : I → H ∪ {h 0 } such that no two agents are assigned to the same house in H, i.e., for each h ∈ H, |µ −1 (h)| ≤ 1 (the null house can be assigned to more than one agent). Given a matching µ for problem (I, H, R) and an agent i ∈ I, µ(i) ∈ (H ∪ {h 0 }) denotes the house agent i is matched to under µ and is referred to as the allotment of agent i. For each agent i ∈ I and matchings µ, µ , we let µ R i µ if and only if µ(i) R i µ (i), i.e., agents only care about their own allotments but not how the remaining houses are allocated.
A rule φ is a function that associates with each problem (I, H, R) a matching φ(I, H, R). Given a problem (I, H, R), an agent i ∈ I, and a rule φ, φ i (I, H, R) denotes the allotment of agent i at matching φ(I, H, R). For a group of agents I ⊆ I we define φ I (I, H, R) := i∈I φ i (I, H, R).
The first property of a rule we introduce is the well-known condition of Pareto-optimality.
Definition 1 (Pareto-Optimality). A matching µ is Pareto-optimal for problem (I, H, R) if there is no other matching µ for problem (I, H, R) such that for each agent i ∈ I, µ R i µ and for some j ∈ I, µ P j µ. A rule φ is Pareto-optimal if it only assigns Pareto-optimal matchings.
Next, we introduce voluntary participation conditions based on the idea that no tenant can be forced to be assigned a house that is worse than the house he already occupies and no agent can be forced to be matched to a house that is unacceptable to him.
Definition 2 (Individual-Rationality). A matching µ is individually-rational for tenants for problem (I, H, R) if for each tenant i ∈ I T , µ(i) R i h(i). A matching µ is individuallyrational for problem (I, H, R) if for each agent i ∈ I, µ(i) R i h(i). A rule φ is individuallyrational (for tenants) if it only assigns individually-rational (for tenants) matchings.
Note that Pareto-optimality and individual-rationality for tenants together imply individual-rationality (since every tenant finds his occupied house acceptable and if an applicant receives an unacceptable allotment, then we can make him better off by assigning the null house to him without making any other agent worse off). For simplicity we use the stronger notion of individual-rationality but we could use the weaker version of individualrationality for tenants throughout.
The well-known non-manipulability property strategy-proofness requires that no agent can ever benefit from misrepresenting his preferences.
Definition 3 (Strategy-Proofness). A rule φ is strategy-proof if for each problem (I, H, R), each agent i ∈ I, and each preference relation R i ∈ R(i, H),
The next property was introduced by Pápai (2000) to exclude joint preference manipulation by two individuals who plan to swap objects ex post under the condition that the collusion changed both their allotments and is self enforcing in the sense that neither agent changes his allotment in case he misreports while the other agent reports the truth.
Definition 4 (Reallocation-Proofness). A rule φ is reallocation-proof if for each problem (I, H, R) and each pair of agents i, j ∈ I, there exist no preference relations R i ∈ R(i, H) and R j ∈ R(j, H) such that
Next, we formulate a consistency notion for house allocation with existing tenants (as introduced by Sönmez andÜnver, 2010) : if some agents leave a house allocation problem with existing tenants with their allotments and possibly some unassigned houses are removed, as long as no tenant is left behind while his occupied house is removed, the rule should allocate the remaining houses among the agents who did not leave in the same way as in the original house allocation problem with existing tenants. For problems with only applicants, consistency for house allocation problem with existing tenants implies reallocation-consistency 16 as introduced by Ehlers and Klaus (2006) as well as the standard consistency 14 property (e.g., Ehlers and Klaus, 2007; Ergin, 2000 Ergin, , 2002 . We introduce some notation before defining consistency.
For each agent i ∈ I, preference relation R i ∈ R(i, H), and set of houses 
Definition 5 (Consistency). A rule φ is consistent if for each problem (I, H, R) and each removal of a set of agents I I together with their allotments under φ, H = φ I (I, H, R), and some unassigned houses H ⊆ H that results in a reduced problem (
), it follows that for each agent i ∈ (I \ I),
).
For problems with only applicants, a well-known property that is implied by consistency, called non-bossiness, requires that whenever a change in an agent's preference relation does not bring about a change in his allotment, it does not bring about a change in anybody's allotment (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) .
Definition 6 (Non-Bossiness). A rule φ is non-bossy if for each problem (I, H, R), each agent i ∈ I, and each preference relation R i ∈ R(i, H), if
Remark 1 (Consistency does not imply Non-Bossiness). For problems with only applicants we can easily see why consistency implies non-bossiness: If an applicant unilaterally changes his preferences such that he receives the same allotment, then, since this allotment is a vacant house, in each of the two problems he can leave with his allotment and two reduced problems in the domain of house allocation problems result. These two problems are identical and hence have to have the same matching. Thus, by consistency, also the matchings in the two original problems have to have been identical. For house allocation problems with existing tenants, consistency does not imply nonbossiness anymore. The reason is that if an agent i now unilaterally changes his preferences such that he receives the same allotment, and this allotment is an occupied house, when leaving with only the occupied house, its tenant would be left behind and hence the resulting reduced problems are not in the domain of house allocation with existing tenants problems. Thus, consistency has no bite. One then could try to remove the smallest set of tenants together with agent i such that a well-defined house allocation with existing tenants problems results. However, the set of removed tenants or their allotments need not be the same and different reduced house allocation with existing tenants problems might result. Again, we cannot conclude that the matchings in the two original problems have to have been identical.
We will show in Section 4, Example 6 that even if we also assume Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, and strategy-proofness, consistency does not imply non-bossiness.
Strategy-proofness and non-bossiness are equivalent to group strategy-proofness (see, e.g., Pápai, 2000) .
Definition 7 (Group Strategy-Proofness). A rule φ is group strategy-proof if for each problem (I, H, R), there is no group of agents I ⊆ I and no preference profile R ∈ R( I, H), such that for all i ∈ I,
and for some j ∈ I, φ j (I, H, ( R, R − I ) P j φ j (I, H, R).
A recent survey (Thomson, 2016 ) discusses many other logical relationships of nonbossiness with well-known normative or strategic properties.
Priority Structures and Top Trading Cycles Rules
For I ⊆ I let Π I denote all one-to-one functions from {1, . . . , |I|} to I. For the set of all agents I and each house h ∈ H, π h ∈ Π I denotes the priority ordering for house h. Here agent π h (1) has the top priority at house h, agent π h (2) has the second priority at h, and so on. By a slight abuse of notation we will also denote the inverse function (π h ) −1 by π h such that for an agent i ∈ I, π h (i) ∈ {1, . . . , |I|} denotes his rank in the priority. For a subset of agents I ⊆ I we define the restriction of π h to I to be a one-to-one function π
} h∈H of priority orderings, one for each house in H. For a set of agents I ⊆ I, π I ≡ {π h I } h∈H denotes a restricted priority structure. Note that π I = π.
For each problem (I, H, R) and each priority structure π we define the top trading cycles (TTC) rule based on priority structure π recursively using Gale's top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974 , attributed the TTC algorithm that finds a core allocation in housing markets to David Gale): Input. A problem (I, H, R) and a priority structure π.
Step 1. Let I 1 := I and H 1 := H. We construct a (directed) graph with the set of nodes I 1 ∪ H 1 ∪ {h 0 }. For each agent i ∈ I 1 we add a directed edge to his most preferred house in H 1 ∪ {h 0 }. For each directed edge (i, h) (i ∈ I 1 and h ∈ H 1 ) we say that agent i points to house h. For each house h ∈ H 1 we add a directed edge to the highest ranked agent in I 1 in its priority ordering, i.e., to π h I 1
(1). For the null house we add a directed edge to each agent in I 1 .
A trading cycle is a directed cycle in the graph. Given the finite number of nodes, at least one trading cycle exists for the graph. We assign to each agent in a trading cycle the house he points to and remove all trading cycle agents and houses. We define I 2 to be the set of remaining agents and H 2 to be the set of remaining houses and, if I 2 = ∅, we continue with Step 2. Otherwise we stop.
In general at
Step t we have the following:
Step t. We construct a (directed) graph with the set of nodes I t ∪ H t ∪ {h 0 } where I t ⊆ I is the set of agents that remain after Step t − 1 and H t ⊆ H is the set of houses that remain after
Step t − 1. For each agent i ∈ I t we add a directed edge to his most preferred house in H t ∪ {h 0 }. For each house h ∈ H t we add a directed edge to the highest ranked agent in I t in its priority ordering, i.e., to π h It (1). For the null house we add a directed edge to each agent in I t . At least one trading cycle exists for the graph and we assign to each agent in a trading cycle the house he points to and remove all trading cycle agents and houses. We define I t+1 to be the set of remaining agents and H t+1 to be the set of remaining houses and, if I t+1 = ∅, we continue with Step t + 1. Otherwise we stop. Output. The TTC algorithm terminates when all agents in I are assigned a house in H ∪ {h 0 } (it takes at most |I| steps). We denote the house in H ∪ {h 0 } that agent i ∈ I obtains in the TTC algorithm by ϕ π i (I, H, R). The TTC rule based on priority structure π, ϕ π , associates with each problem (I, H, R) the matching determined by the TTC algorithm.
We say that a priority structure π is adapted to the ownership structure if each tenant has top priority at his own house, i.e., for each i ∈ I T , π h(i) (1) = i.
Any priority structure π can be adapted to the ownership structure by moving every tenant to the top of the priority ordering of his own house without changing the ordering of other agents. Formally, for each priority structure π ≡ {π
Given a problem (I, H, R), a priority structure π, and a matching µ, we say that µ violates the priority of agent i ∈ I for house h ∈ H if there exists an agent j ∈ I such that µ(j) = h, π h (i) < π h (j), and h P i µ(i), i.e., agent i has higher priority for house h than agent j but j receives h and i justifiably envies j. A rule φ adapts to a priority structure π if for each problem (I, H, R), φ(I, H, R) does not violate the priority of any agent for any house.
All TTC rules based on ownership-adapted priority structures are Pareto-optimal, individually-rational, group strategy-proof, and reallocation-proof.
Proposition 1 (ϕ π : Pareto-Optimality, Individual-Rationality, Group StrategyProofness, Reallocation-Proofness). For each priority structure π that is adapted to the ownership structure, the TTC rule based on π, ϕ π , satisfies Pareto-optimality, individualrationality, group strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness.
Proof. Individual-rationality of ϕ π follows from the facts that π is adapted to the ownership structure and no agent points to a house that is unacceptable for him at any step of the TTC algorithm. Pareto-optimality and group strategy-proofness follow from the well-known fact that TTC rules satisfy these properties. In particular, each TTC rule based on a priority structure is a "hierarchical exchange rule" and therefore satisfies Pareto-optimality, group strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness (see Pápai, 2000) .
Acyclic Priorities, Top Trading Cycles Rules, and Consistency
For more general house allocation problems where each house can have multiple identical copies, the house allocation with quotas model (also known as school choice model), Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006) introduced acyclicity conditions for priority structures that coincide for problems with only applicants. We extend their acyclicity notion to house allocation problems with existing tenants.
Definition 8 (Acyclicity). For a set of agents I ⊆ I and a restricted priority structure π I that is adapted to the ownership structure, π I is acyclic if for agents i, j, k ∈ I and houses h, h ∈ H such that h is not owned by any of the three agents, i.e., h / ∈ {h(i),
As already mentioned above, for problems with only applicants our definition of acyclicity coincides with Ergin and Kesten acyclicity.
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The following is an example of an (ownership-adapted) acyclic priority structure.
Example 1 (An Acyclic Priority Structure). Table 3 gives an example of an (ownershipadapted) acyclic priority structure π for a problem with three tenants a, b, c, five applicants d, e, f, g, i and eight houses h(a),
c a e e a a e e 5 e e a a e e a a 6 21 In general, if a priority structure is Kesten acyclic, then it is also Ergin acyclic (note that in the more general house allocation with quotas model additional "scarcity conditions" are used to define Ergin and Kesten cycles).
The next example illustrates the TTC rule with the acyclic priority structure of Example 1 (Table 3) .
Example 2 (TTC Rule based on Acyclic Priorities). Let I = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, i} and
Consider the preference profile R ∈ R(I, H) defined as in Table 4 . Table 4 : A preference profile.
We consider the TTC assignment with priority structure π given in Table 3 for problem (I, H, R). Table 5 gives the set of agents and houses present in the steps of the TTC and the top trading cycles that form in each step. In the final assignment µ = ϕ
Next, one could think that to obtain acyclic priorities for problems with existing tenants one can take any acyclic priority structure for problems with only applicants and adapt it to the ownership structure. However, the following example shows that this might not result in acyclic priorities for problems with existing tenants and that the associated TTC rule violates consistency.
Example 3 (Cyclic Priorities when Adapted to Ownership and Inconsistency). Let (I, H, R) be a problem where I = {i, j, k}, H = {h, h }, and π
Note that if none of the agents in I is a tenant of any house in H, then π I is acyclic for agents i, j, k and houses h, h . Now assume that agent k is the tenant of house h, i.e., h = h(k), while house h is vacant. Then, the ownership-adapted priority structure π is such that
, which is not acyclic anymore. We now show that with the TTC based on the ownership adapted but cyclic priorities π is not consistent.
Assume that preferences R = (R i , R j , R k ) are such that
The TTC rule based on the priority structure π for problem (I, H, R) results in allotments ϕ
We now consider the reduced problem (I , H , R ) obtained from (I, H, R) by removing agent k with his allotment ϕ π k (I, H, R) = h (h is a vacant house). Therefore, I = {i, j}, H = {h(k)} (now h(k) is vacant), and preferences are R = (R H i , R H j ). The TTC rule based on the priority structure π for problem (I , H , R ) results in allotments ϕ
Hence, the TTC rule based on (cyclic) priority structure π violates consistency.
The fact that the TTC rule based on a cyclic priority structure in Example 3 is not consistent is not a coincidence: any TTC rule based on ownership-adapted priorities is consistent if and only if the priority structure is acyclic.
Theorem 1 (ϕ π : Consistency ⇔ π is Acyclic). Let π be a priority structure that is adapted to the ownership structure. Then, the TTC rule based on π, ϕ π , is consistent if and only if π is acyclic.
Proof. Let π be a priority structure that is adapted to the ownership structure. Only If Part: Assume that ϕ π is consistent. We show that then π is acyclic. Assume for the sake of contradiction that π is cyclic. Hence, there exist agents i, j, k ∈ I and houses h, h ∈ H with h / ∈ {h(i), h(j), h(k)} such that
Since π is adapted to the ownership structure, if h ∈ {h(i), h(j), h(k)}, then h = h(i) (since among the three agents agent i has the top priority for house h). Consider the problem (I, H, R) where I = {i, j, k}, H ∪{h 0 } = {h, h , h(i), h(j), h(k), h 0 }, and preferences are such that
. ., and
Then, the TTC rule ϕ
π assigns h to i, h to k (because agent i has the top priority for house h, agent k has the top priority for house h , and then they trade), and h(j) to j. Next, consider the reduced problem (I , H , R H I ) where agent i leaves with his allotment h , i.e., I = {j, k} and H ∪ {h 0 } = {h, h(i), h(j), h(k), h 0 }. Now, the TTC rule ϕ π assigns h to j (because agent j has the top priority for house h in I and house h is the best house among H for agent j) and h(k) to k; contradicting consistency.
If Part: Assume that π is acyclic. We show that then ϕ π is consistent. Consider a problem (I, H, R) and remove a set of agents I I together with their allotments H as well as some unassigned houses H to obtain a reduced problem (I , H , R
; that is, the occupied houses of tenants in I are in H : for each i ∈ I T , h(i) ∈ H . We will show that for each j ∈ I , ϕ π j (I, H, R) = ϕ π j (I , H , R H I ). It suffices to consider the following four cases (all other cases can be obtained by iteratively applying these four cases): Case 1. Only one unassigned house is removed: for h ∈ H V and h ∈ ϕ π I (I, H, R), I = ∅, H = ∅, and H = {h}. Case 2. An applicant who is assigned the null house is removed: for i ∈ I A with ϕ
and H = ∅. Case 4. A recipient of a vacant house is removed together with his allotment: for h ∈ H V with ϕ π i (I, H, R) = h, I = {i}, H = {h}, and H = ∅. In Case 1, note that during any step of the TTC algorithm with priorities π applied to the problem (I, H, R), no agent points to house h; otherwise h would be assigned. Thus, removing house h from the problem does not change the outcome of the algorithm and
). In Case 2, note that during any step of the TTC algorithm with priorities π applied to the problem (I, H, R), agents who point to h 0 can obtain it independently of whether i points to it or not. Thus, removing agent i from the problem does not change the outcome of the algorithm for agents in I \ {i} and ϕ
In Case 3, consider a preference profile R ∈ R(I, H) such that R − I = R − I and for each i ∈ I and each h ∈ H \ {ϕ
Starting from problem (I, H, R), if any of the agents i ∈ I changes his preferences from R i to R i , by strategy-proofness of the TTC rule, he will receive the same allotment before and after. Then, by non-bossiness of the TTC rule, the allotments of all other agents will also not change. This argument can be applied step by step for all agents in I to move from problem (I, H, R) to problem (I, H, R). Hence, by group strategy-proofness of the TTC rule, we have ϕ
. By the definition of preferences R, in the first step of the TTC algorithm with priorities π applied to the problem (I, H, R), the trading cycle [i 0 , h(i 1 ), i 1 , . . . , i K , h(i 0 )] forms. After allocating houses according to this trading cycle and after removing it, the problem becomes the reduced problem (I , H , R H I ). Note that other trading cycles that formed in Step 1 for problems (I, H, R) will form again in Step 1 for the reduced problem (I , H , R H I ). Thus, for each i ∈ I we have ϕ
Since ϕ π (I, H, R) = ϕ π (I, H, R) this concludes the proof for Case 3.
In Case 4, consider a preference profile R ∈ R(I, H) such that R i = R i and for each j ∈ I = I \ {i} preferences R j are obtained from R j by making house h unacceptable, i.e., h(j) P j h while leaving preferences over H = H \ {h} unchanged and thus R H I = R H I . Starting from problem (I, H, R), if any of the agents j ∈ I changes his preferences from R j to R j , by strategy-proofness of the TTC rule, he will receive the same allotment before and after. Then, by non-bossiness of the TTC rule, the allotments of all other agents will also not change. This argument can be applied step by step for all agents in I to move from problem (I, H, R) to problem (I, H, R). Hence, by group strategy-proofness of the TTC rule, we have ϕ π (I, H, R) = ϕ π (I, H, R). During the TTC algorithm with priorities π applied to the problem (I, H, R), a trading cycle including i and h forms. By the definition of preferences R, the same trading cycles form in the first t − 1 steps of the TTC algorithm with priorities π applied to the two problems (I, H, R) and (I , H , R H I ). Next, we consider Step t of the TTC algorithm with priorities π in the two problems.
If K = 1, i.e., if agent i points to h and house h points to i in Step t in problem (I, H, R), then the only difference between the two problems is that in problem (I, H, R) we have an additional trading cycle consisting of i and h. Otherwise, the same trading cycles form in the two problems. Moreover, in the consecutive Steps t + 1, t + 2, . . . the same trading cycles form in the two problems. Thus, for each j ∈ I = I \ {i}, we have ϕ
Step t of the TTC algorithm applied to (I , H , R H I ) the trading cycle i 1 , h 1 , . . . , i K , h K forms. If this is true, then it follows immediately that all other trading cycles in the two problems are the same and moreover, in the consecutive Steps t + 1, t + 2, . . . the same trading cycles form in the two problems. To show that trading cycle i 1 , h 1 , . . . , i K , h K forms, it suffices to show that h K points to i 1 in Step t of the TTC algorithm applied to problem (I , H , R H I ). Suppose not and house h K points to an agent j = i 1 . Then,
, since otherwise h 0 = h would not point to i 1 in Step t of the TTC algorithm with priorities π applied to problem (I, H, R). Thus, there is a cycle in π, contradicting its acyclicity.
A Representation of TTC Rules based on Ownership-Adapted Acyclic Priorities as Two-Step Rules
We show that a TTC rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities can be decomposed into a so-called two-step rule where the first rule is an almost YRMH-IGYT rule and the second rule is an efficient priority rule (Proposition 2). We first introduce the class of efficient priority rules.
A rule adapts to the priority structure if and only if it chooses stable matchings, or equivalently, no justified envy occurs (see Balinski and Sönmez, 1999, Lemma 2) . A rule is an efficient priority rule if the assignment of houses to agents are determined by the agentsproposing deferred acceptance rule and it adapts to an (Ergin) acyclic priority structure. Since Ergin and Kesten acyclicity coincide for problems with only applicants, by Kesten (2006, Theorem 1) the agents-proposing deferred acceptance rule based on acyclic priorities is the TTC rule based on acyclic priorities. Hence, for problems with only applicants, the class of efficient priority rules is the subclass of TTC rules where for each problem with only applicants there is either one agent with the highest priority for all houses or there are two agents who share the first and second priorities of each house, i.e., the acyclic priority structure π is such that
• for each problem with only applicants (I, H, R) there is an agent i ∈ I such that for each h ∈ H, π h I (1) = i, or there are two agents i, j ∈ I such that for each h ∈ H, {π h I (1), π h I (2)} = {i, j}. Hence, at each step of the TTC algorithm, each trading cycle contains at most two agents and two houses. That is, at each step of the TTC algorithm, either the top priorities of remaining houses are assigned to exactly one agent (a dictator) or the top priorities of remaining houses are divided between two agents. If there is an agent (a dictator) who has top priority for all remaining houses then he gets his best house among the remaining houses. If the top priorities of remaining houses are divided between two agents, then, at that step of the TTC algorithm, either (i) both agents get a house for which they have the top priority, or (ii) they swap two houses for which they have top priorities, or (iii) only one of them gets one of his top priority houses and the other gets nothing. In the last case, the agent who gets nothing becomes a dictator at the next step of the TTC algorithm because of acyclicity of the priority structure.
For problems with only applicants, Ehlers and Klaus (2006, Proposition 2 and Theorem 1) characterized the class of efficient priority rules by Pareto-optimality, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency.
For more general house allocation problems with existing tenants, TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities have the property that at each step of the TTC algorithm at most two applicants and two vacant houses are involved in a trading cycle. A very natural subclass of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities is the class of rules where at each step of the TTC algorithm, at most one trading cycle involving a vacant house appears and this trading cycle contains at most one applicant and at most one vacant house. This class was introduced under the name of YRMH-IGYT (you request my house -I get your turn) rules by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) . Sönmez and Unver (2010) showed that a rule satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategyproofness, weak neutrality, and consistency if and only if it is a YRMH-IGYT rule.
The class of YRMH-IGYT rules is the subclass of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities where for each problem there is a single agent who has top priority at each vacant house, i.e., the priority structure π is such that (i) for each problem (I, H, R) and for each i ∈ I T , π h(i) I (1) = i and (ii) for each problem (I, H, R) there exists an agent i ∈ I such that for each h ∈ H V , π h I (1) = i. Another way to describe the set of YRMH-IGYT rule is as follows. Let π be a serial dictatorship priority structure. Then, for any h, h ∈ H, π h = π h , i.e., every house has the same priority ordering. Let π denote the priority structure obtained from π by adapting it to the ownership structure. It is easy to see that, since π is a serial dictatorship priority structure, π is acyclic. Then, a rule φ is a YRMH-IGYT rule if and only if there exists a serial dictatorship priority structure π such that φ = ϕ π .
Next we give an alternative description of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities in terms of two specific rules, YRMH-IGYT and efficient priority rules, that are applied in two steps. That is, the class of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities is equivalent to a class of two-step rules. Essentially, these rules can be described as follows: The agents are split into two groups, where the first group contains all tenants and some applicants and the second group consists of only applicants. In the first step, houses are allocated to the first group of agents according to -essentially -the YRMH-IGYT rule. In the second step, houses that have not been allocated in the first step are allocated to the second group of agents according to an efficient priority rule.
We used the term "essentially" in the previous paragraph, because the allocation in the first step is generated according to a rule that might slightly differ from a YRMH-IGYT rule because we allow for the possibility that two agents have top priority at different vacant houses in steps of the TTC where only these two agents are left in the problem.
Formally, we define a TTC rule ϕ π based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities π to be an almost YRMH-IGYT rule if (i) for each problem (I, H, R) and for each i ∈ I T , π h(i) I (1) = i and (ii) for each problem (I, H, R) with |I| > 2 there exists an agent i ∈ I such that for each h ∈ H V , π h I (1) = i. That is, for each problem each tenant has the top priority for his own house and for each problem with more than two agents there exists an agent who has top priority for all vacant houses. This means that at each step of the TTC algorithm a tenant has the top priority for his own house and at each step of the TTC algorithm with more than two remaining agents there exists an agent who has top priority for all remaining vacant houses. Note that then the difference between a YRMH-IGYT rule and an almost YRMH-IGYT rule is that for the latter rule, the underlying priorities are only almost serial dictatorship priorities because the two lowest ranked agents might share ownership of remaining vacant houses. For problems with a large number of agents, such a rule behaves essentially like a YRMH-IGYT rule.
Example 4 (An almost YRMH-IGYT rule). Consider agents I := {a, b, c, d, e} with I T = {a, b, c}, houses {h(a), h(b), h(c), h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 , h 5 } and the following priority structure:
Note that the TTC algorithm based on Table 6 priorities assigns allotments equal to the YRMH-IGYT rule for any Step t with |I t | > 2. However, for a last Step t with I t = {a, e}, the TTC algorithm might assign different allotments because agents a and e have different priorities at different vacant houses (the YRMH-IGYT rule would assign priorities dictatorially at that step as well). Table 6 : An acyclic priority structure: the top part of the priorities of Table 3 .
Definition 9 (Two-Step Rules). A rule φ is a two-step rule if there are
• a partition of the set of agents I = I 1 ∪ I 2 such that the first group contains all tenants I T ⊆ I 1 and
• rules φ 1 and φ 2 such that rule φ 1 is an almost YRMH-IGYT rule that is defined for all problems (I, H, R) with I ⊆ I 1 and rule φ 2 is an efficient priority rule that is defined for all problems (I, H, R) with I ⊆ I 2 , and these rules are applied in two steps as follows:
Step 1. for each problem (I, H, R) and each i ∈ I 1 := I 1 ∩ I we have φ i (I, H, R) = φ Example 5 (A TTC Rule based on Ownership-Adapted Acyclic Priorities as a Two-Step Rule). We reconsider the TTC rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities π defined by Table 3 that we discussed in Example 2. It can be reinterpreted as a two-step rule as follows: To determine the first group of agents I 1 , we consider the lowest priority that any tenant has for any house. For the priorities π given in Table 3 , this lowest priority of 5 is given to tenant a (e.g., for house h 1 ). Then, we consider all agents that have as least as high a priority at all houses: I 1 := {j ∈ I | π h (j) ≤ 5 for all h ∈ H} = {a, b, c, d, e}. The remaining agents form the second group I 2 := {f, g, i}.
The rule φ 1 is the almost YRMH-IGYT rule based on Table 6 priorities previously described in Example 4. Rule φ 2 is now defined through the (acyclic) priorities consisting of the last three rows of Table 3 : Note that for any problem (I, H, R) with I ⊆ I 2 the TTC rule based on Table 7 priorities is an efficient priority rule.
We now show that the correspondence between TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities and two-step rules holds in general.
Proposition 2 (Characterizing TTC Rules based on Ownership-Adapted Acyclic Priorities as Two-Step Rules). The class of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities is the class of two-step rules.
Proof. Let ϕ π be a TTC rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities π. Consider the lowest priority assigned to a tenant at π, i.e., m := max h∈H,i∈I T π h (i). Let i * ∈ I T be a tenant and h * ∈ H be a house such that π h * (i * ) = m. We define the set I 1 to be the set of agents who have higher or equal priority for house h * than agent i * , i.e., I 1 := {j ∈ I | π h * (j) ≤ m}. The set I 2 is the set of agents who have lower priority for house h * than agent i * , i.e., I 2 := {j ∈ I | π h * (j) > m} = I \ I 1 . By definition, the two sets are disjoint, we have I T ⊆ I 1 and I = I 1 ∪ I 2 .
First we show that agents in I 1 have higher priority than agents in I 2 at all houses, i.e., for each h ∈ H we have I 1 = {j ∈ I | π h (j) ≤ m} and I 2 = {j ∈ I | π h (j) > m}. Consider j ∈ I 1 \ {i * } and k ∈ I 2 and assume by contradiction that there is a house
, acyclicity implies that h * is occupied with j as a tenant. Since i * 's priority at h * is the lowest priority of any tenant at any house, tenant j cannot have lower priority at h than i * has at h * , i.e., π h (j) ≤ π h * (i * ). Thus, there exists an agent with
But then agents k, j, with houses h, h * form a cycle; a contradiction. Next let k ∈ I 2 and suppose there is a house h ∈ H with π h (k) < π h (i * ). We may assume that there is another agent j ∈ I 1 with π h * (j) < π h * (i * ) and π h (i * ) < π h (j). Otherwise i * would have lower priority at h than at h * . But since k / ∈ I T , we immediately get a contradiction with acyclicity.
Second, we show that the rule ϕ π restricted to problems with agents in I 1 is an almost YRMH-IGYT rule and restricted to problems with agents in I 2 is an efficient priority rule. This will imply that ϕ π is a two-step rule. Thus, we have to show that
• for each problem (I, H, R) with I ⊆ I 1 and |I| > 2 there is an agent i ∈ I such that for each h ∈ H V , π h I (i) = 1, • for each problem (I, H, R) with I ⊆ I 2 there is an agent i ∈ I such that for h ∈ H, π h I (1) = i, or there are two agents i, j ∈ I such that for each h ∈ H, {π h I (1), π h I (2)} = {i, j}.
Since I 2 contains only applicants and the priority structure π is acyclic, the second item follows immediately from the fact that for problems with only applicants the class of TTC rules based on acyclic priorities is the class of efficient priority rules.
Recall that i
* is a tenant who is assigned the lowest priority at π for some houses and such a house is h * . To show the first item, consider the problem (I , H , R ) with
(2). We claim that at any h ∈ H V we have π (1) = j and we are finished. Thus, it suffices to show that π h I (1) = i * yields a contradiction. Since |I| > 2, there is an agent k = i * , j in the problem (I , H , R ). Since I ⊆ I 1 and i * has lowest priority among agents in I 1 at house h * , we have π h * (k) < π h * (i * ) and π h * (j) < π h * (i * ). Thus, if π h I (i * ) = 1, then we have a cycle involving houses h, h * and agents i * , j, k and hence, a contradiction.
Finally, let φ be a two-step rule induced by rules φ 1 and φ 2 . Let π 1 be the priority structure associated with rule φ 1 and π 2 be the priority structure associated with rule φ 2 . Define a priority structure π as the concatenation of the two priority structures, i.e., for each h ∈ H we let
Since π 1 and π 2 are acyclic priority structures, priority structure π is acyclic as well. Moreover, φ = ϕ π .
4 Pareto-Optimality, Group Strategy-Proofness, Consistency, and Reallocation-Proofness
In the introduction we reviewed several classes of rules for house allocation with and without tenants and their properties, see Tables 1 and 2 . We observed that (weak) neutrality is the key property that distinguishes simple serial dictatorship and YRMH-IGYT rules from other rules. For house allocation rules various sets of rules have been characterized by subsets of the following properties: Pareto-optimality, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness (Pycia and Unver, 2017) , and reallocation-proofness (Pápai, 2000) or reallocation-consistency (Ehlers and Klaus, 2006) . For house allocation with existing tenants only one characterization of the YRMH-IGYT rules using (weak) neutrality is known (Sönmez andÜnver, 2010) . We aim to understand what rules emerge without (weak) neutrality. First, recall that for house allocation problems, Ehlers and Klaus (2006) characterized efficient priority rules for house allocation problems by Pareto-optimality, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Since efficient priority rules are a subset of hierarchical exchange rules (Pápai, 2000) and of trading cycles rules (Pycia andÜnver, 2017) , Paretooptimality, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency 22 imply reallocation-proofness and non-bossiness. We first show that this is not the case for house allocation problems with existing tenants. In the next example we define a rule, φ, for problems with one tenant and at least two applicants and show that it satisfies Pareto-optimality, individualrationality, strategy-proofness, and consistency but that it violates reallocation-proofness and non-bossiness.
Example 6 (A Rule that is Consistent but neither Non-Bossy nor ReallocationProof ). Let I be the set of potential agents with I T = {i} and {j, k} ⊆ I A . Let H be the set of potential houses such that h(i) is the only occupied house. We consider two priority structures π and π defined below. We let π I\{i,j,k} = π I\{i,j,k} be an acyclic priority structure. Let π {i,j,k} be a priority structure (for agents i, j, and k) defined by
Let π {i,j,k} be a priority structure (for agents i, j, and k) defined by
Hence, π h(i) = π h(i) but priorities of vacant houses differ. We let π be the concatenation of π {i,j,k} and π I\{i,j,k} and π be the concatenation of π {i,j,k} and π I\{i,j,k} . Note that agents i, j, and k are the highest ranked agents under priorities π and π. For each problem (I, H, R), I ⊆ I and H ⊆ H, we partition R(I, H) = R 1 (I, H) ∪ R 2 (I, H) into two sets as follows:
• If i, k ∈ I we let R 2 (I, H) be the set of all profiles R ∈ R(I, H) such that one of the two following statements is true:
1. agent k ranks h(i) best and i does not rank h(i) best;
2. agent k ranks h(i) second best and both agents i and k rank the same house best.
We let R 1 (I, H) = R(I, H) \ R 2 (I, H).
• If i / ∈ I or k / ∈ I, then we let R 1 (I, H) = R(I, H) and R 2 (I, H) = ∅.
We use the partition of preference profiles to define our rule φ as follows: For each problem (I, H, R),
that is, if agents i and k are present and preferences R belong to R 2 (I, H), we use the TTC rule based on π and otherwise we use the TTC rule based on π. We prove in Appendix A that rule φ satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, and consistency but neither reallocation-proofness nor non-bossiness.
A Characterization of TTC Rules based on OwnershipAdapted Acyclic Priorities with Reallocation-Proofness
Our next main result is that TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities are the only rules that satisfy Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, and reallocation-proofness.
Theorem 2 (A Characterization of ϕ π with Reallocation-Proofness). A rule φ satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, reallocation-proofness, and consistency if and only if there exists an ownership-adapted acyclic priority structure π such that φ = ϕ π .
Note that for the only-if-part of Theorem 2 it suffices to require reallocation-proofness only for pairs of agents that contain at least one tenant (see proof of Lemma 4). Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 2 reveals that in the characterization, reallocation-proofness is not needed if I = I A .
We prove Theorem 2 through a sequence of lemmata (which we prove in Appendix B). Throughout the remainder of this section we assume that rule φ satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, reallocation-proofness, 23 and consistency.
Using Pareto-optimality and individual-rationality, we derive a priority structure π = (π h ) h∈H from φ.
For each house h ∈ H we call a preference profile at which each agent likes house h best and only finds houses in {h, h(i)} individually-rational a version of a maximal conflict preference profile for h. Formally, R h ∈ R(I, H) is a version of a maximal conflict preference profile for h if for each i ∈ I and h ∈ H \ {h, h(i)} we have
Note that there can be multiple versions of a maximal conflict preference profile for h that differ in the ranking of houses that are not individually-rational. After we have defined π h we will show that the definition is independent of which versions of maximal conflict preference profiles we choose.
We consider the problem (I, H, R h ) where R h is some version of a maximal conflict preference profile. By Pareto-optimality, for some i ∈ I we have φ i (I, H, R h ) = h. We assign the top priority of house h to agent i, i.e., π h (1) = i.
Note that, by individual-rationality, if house h is occupied by a tenant i, then agent i will have the top priority at house h, i.e., if for some i ∈ I T , h = h(i), then π h(i) (1) = i. Hence, the priority structure π we are constructing will be adapted to the ownership structure, i.e., for each i ∈ I T , π h(i) (1) = i.
We next remove agent π h (1) = i and consider the remaining maximal conflict problem (I\ {i}, H, R h −i ). Again, by Pareto-optimality, for some j ∈ I \ {i} we have φ j (I \ {i}, H, R h −i ) = h. We assign the second priority of house h to agent j, i.e., π h (2) = j. We next remove agent π h (2) = j and consider the remaining maximal conflict problem (I \ {i, j}, H, R h −{i,j} ), etc. We iterate in this way until we have considered all agents in I. In this way we obtain a priority ordering π h for each h ∈ H.
Next, we establish a sequence of lemmata about properties of π.
Lemma 1 (Maximal Conflict Preference Profile Independence). Each version of a maximal conflict preference profile for a house together with rule φ induces the same priority ranking for the house.
From now on, we simply refer to maximal conflict preference profiles with the understanding that it does not matter which version is used.
Lemma 2 (Consistent Reduction of Maximal Conflict Preference Profiles). Let i, j ∈ I be two different agents and house h ∈ H. Consider a problem (I, H, R) such that I = {i, j}, {h, h(i), h(j)} ⊆ H ∪ {h 0 }, and R ∈ R(I, H) is a maximal conflict preference profile for h restricted to I and H. Then,
Lemma 3 (Acyclicity for Vacant Houses). Let i, j, k ∈ I be three different agents and assume that houses h, h ∈ H are not owned by any of them, i.e., h, h ∈ {h(i),
Lemma 4 (Acyclicity for Occupied Houses). Let i, j, k ∈ I be three different agents and assume that house h(i) ∈ H is occupied by agent i and house h ∈ H is not owned by any of the three agents, i.e., h ∈ {h(i), h(j), h(k)}. Then,
Lemmata 3 and 4 together imply that our constructed priority structure π is acyclic. We are now ready to start proving that if a rule φ satisfies Pareto-optimality, individualrationality, strategy-proofness, reallocation-proofness, and consistency, then it is a TTC rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities, i.e., φ = ϕ π . To this end, we first show that φ adapts to the priority structure π for top priority agents.
Lemma 5 (Top Priority Adaptation). For each problem (I, H, R), if agent i ∈ I has the top priority in I for a vacant house h ∈ H V , i.e., for each j ∈ I \ {i}, π
We now prove that rule φ is the TTC rule ϕ π .
Proposition 3 (φ = ϕ π ). If a rule φ satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, reallocation-proofness, and consistency, then it is the TTC rule that is based on the ownership-adapted acyclic priority structure π, i.e., φ = ϕ π .
Proof. Let (I, H, R) be a problem. We show that ϕ π (I, H, R) = φ(I, H, R). First note that by consistency, it suffices to consider the first step of TTC rule ϕ π (I, H, R): Once we have shown that for each trading cycle that forms in the first step, each agent in the cycle obtains the same allotment under ϕ π and φ, we can consider the reduced problem (I , H , R ) where these agents are removed together with their allotments under ϕ π and φ. Then, when we subsequently consider the first step of ϕ π (I , H , R ), by consistency of ϕ π (which follows from Lemmata 3 and 4 and Theorem 1), each trading cycle that forms in the first step of ϕ π (I , H , R ) also forms in the second step of ϕ π (I, H, R) and vice versa. Thus, if in each trading cycle that forms in the first step of ϕ π (I , H , R ) the agents in the cycle obtain the same allotment under ϕ π and φ, then in each trading cycle that forms in the second step of ϕ π (I, H, R) the agents in the cycle obtain the same allotment under ϕ π and φ, and so on. Thus, consider a trading cycle that forms in the first step of ϕ π (I, H, R), consisting of agents i 0 , . . . , i K and houses ϕ
e.g., by moving ϕ
(I, H, R) without changing the ordering of other houses.
First, we consider the preference profile
(I, H, R) is a vacant house and agent i k has the top priority for it. Hence, by Lemma 5, we have
That is, when agent l 1 changes his preferences from R l 1 to R l 1 at the preference profile R 0 , house ϕ π l 1 (I, H, R) is still assigned to him under rule φ at the changed preference profile R 1 . By strategy-proofness we have
. Now, let l 2 ∈ {i 0 , . . . , i K } \ {l 1 }, and we consider the preference profile
). We first show that φ l 2 (I, H, R 2 ) = ϕ π l 2 (I, H, R). That is, when agent l 2 changes his preferences from R l 2 to R l 2 at the pre-ference profile R 1 , house ϕ π l 2 (I, H, R) is still assigned to him under rule φ at the changed preference profile R 2 . By strategy-proofness we have φ l 2 (I,
(I, H, R) is agent l 2 's best house at preference profiles R 1 and R 2 , we have
(I, H, R). Since the choice of agents {l 1 , l 2 } ⊆ {i 0 , . . . , i K } was arbitrary, we obtain by the same argument changing the roles of l 1 and l 2 that φ l 1 (I, H, R 2 ) = ϕ
. We continue to replace the preferences of agents in {i 0 , . . . , i K } \ {l 1 , l 2 } one at a time as above and reach the preference profile R such that for each
Finally, recall that by Proposition 1, the TTC rule ϕ π satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness and by Theorem 1 and the acyclicity of π (Lemmata 3 and 4), ϕ π is consistent. The proof of Theorem 2 is now complete. We prove the independence of properties used in the characterization (Theorem 2) in Appendix D.
A Characterization of TTC Rules based on OwnershipAdapted Acyclic Priorities with Non-Bossiness
Our last main result is that TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities are essentially the only rules that satisfy Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, group strategyproofness, and consistency.
Theorem 3 (A Characterization of ϕ π with Non-Bossiness). Let [|H| = 2 and I T = ∅], or [|H| = 3 and |I T | ≤ 1], or |H| ≥ 4. Then, a rule φ satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency if and only if there exists an ownership-adapted acyclic priority structure π such that φ = ϕ π .
If [|H| = 2 and I T = ∅], then I = I A and non-bossiness is not needed in the characterization (because in the proof of Theorem 2, reallocation-proofness is used only to show acyclicity of occupied houses, Lemma 4, which is not needed if I = I A ). In Appendix E we provide examples that show that the other restrictions on the number of potential houses in Theorem 3 are necessary.
Throughout the remainder of this section we assume that either [|H| = 2 and I T = ∅], or [|H| = 3 and |I T | ≤ 1], or |H| ≥ 4, 24 and that rule φ satisfies Pareto-optimality, individualrationality, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency. Recall that in the previous section reallocation-proofness was used only in the proofs of Lemmata 4 and 5, hence we can use the same construction of priority structure π and Lemmata 1, 2, and 3 remain correct without reallocation-proofness. We prove Theorem 3 through a sequence of additional 24 However, note that this assumption is used only in the proof of Lemma 8. lemmata (which we prove in Appendix C). First we introduce some terminology due to Pycia andÜnver (2017) .
In the following, we will assume that a pair (I, H) ∈ I × H is such that for each tenant i ∈ I T , h(i) ∈ H. Then, under rule φ, agent i ∈ I brokers* house h ∈ H at pair (I, H) if for each preference profile R ∈ R(I, H) such that all agents rank house h top, the house assigned to agent i, φ i (I, H, R), is his second best house according to R i (it is possible that φ i (I, H, R) = h 0 ). The following lemma connects brokerage* to cycles in priority structure π.
Lemma 6 (Broker* Lemma). Let i, j, k ∈ I be three different agents and assume that house h ∈ H is not owned by any of them, i.e., h ∈ {h(i),
then under rule φ, agent j brokers* house h at each pair (I, H) with I = {i, j, k} and h ∈ H.
A first consequence of Lemma 6 is that cycles have a particular structure if they occur at all.
Lemma 7. Let i, j, k ∈ I be three different agents and assume that house h ∈ H is not owned by any of them, i.e., h ∈ {h(i), h(j), h(k)}. If agent i is a tenant, i.e., i ∈ I T ,
and agent j is an applicant, i.e., j ∈ I A .
The two previous lemmata imply a version of Lemma 4 where reallocation-proofness is replaced by non-bossiness.
Lemma 8 (Acyclicity for Occupied Houses, Non-Bossiness Version). Let i, j, k ∈ I be three different agents and assume that house h(i) ∈ H is occupied by agent i and house h ∈ H is not owned by any of the three agents, i.e., h ∈ {h(i), h(j), h(k)}. Then,
With Lemma 8, we can now complete the proof of Theorem 3. By Proposition 1, the TTC rule ϕ π satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, and nonbossiness, and by Theorem 1 and the acyclicity of π (Lemmata 3 and 8), ϕ π is consistent. For the other direction, note that the proof of Proposition 3 only uses reallocation-proofness by relying on Lemma 4, which uses reallocation-proofness in its proof. Thus replacing Lemma 4 by Lemma 8, we can use the same proof as for Proposition 3. We prove the independence of properties used in the characterization (Theorem 3) in Appendix D.
Appendix A A Rule that is Strategy-Proof and Consistent but neither Reallocation-Proof nor Non-Bossy
Note that the two rules ϕ π and ϕ π defined in Example 6 are Pareto-optimal, individuallyrational, and strategy-proof. This immediately implies that φ is Pareto-optimal, individuallyrational and can only be manipulated by agent i or agent k.
Rule φ is Strategy-Proof. First we consider agent i. If R ∈ R 2 (I, H), then, since φ(I, H, R) = ϕ π (I, H, R) and agent i is the highest ranked agent for all houses in H under π, agent i obtains his best house, so he cannot gain by misreporting his preferences. So, consider R ∈ R 1 (I, H). Suppose agent i reports R i and R := (R i , R −i ). We consider two cases, (i) R ∈ R 1 (I, H) and (ii) R ∈ R 2 (I, H).
, and ϕ π is strategy-proof, agent i cannot gain by misreporting R i .
(ii): If R ∈ R 2 (I, H), then either i ranks h(i) first under R i but not under R i , or i and k rank different vacant houses first under R and the same vacant house first under R . In the first case, h(i) = φ i (I, H, R) R i φ i (I, H, R ) and i cannot improve by reporting R i instead of R i . In the second case, since R ∈ R 2 (I, H), φ(I, H, R ) = ϕ π (I, H, R ), and i is the highest ranked agent for all houses at π, i obtains his best house under R i , and this best house (at R i ) is not his best house under his original preferences R i . However, in this case, house h(i) is not the best house at R i and agent i is the second ranked agent for all vacant houses at π; so i obtains at least his second best house under R i at φ(I, H, R) = ϕ π (I, H, R). This, together with the fact that allotment φ i (I, H, R ) is not the best house for agent i under R i , implies that agent i cannot benefit by reporting R i instead of R i .
Second, we consider agent k. If R ∈ R 2 (I, H), then agent k obtains house h(i), which is either his best house or his second best house under R k . If house h(i) is agent k's second best house, then his best house is also agent i's best house. However, note that agent i has higher priority than agent k for all houses under both π and π. Thus, agent k cannot gain from misreporting his preferences in this case. So, consider R ∈ R 1 (I, H). Suppose agent k reports R k and R := (R k , R −k ). We consider two cases, (i) R ∈ R 1 (I, H) and (ii) R ∈ R 2 (I, H).
, and ϕ π is strategy-proof, agent k cannot gain by misreporting R k .
(ii): If R ∈ R 2 (I, H), then agent k obtains house h(i) under φ(I, H, R ) = ϕ π (I, H, R ). Since R / ∈ R 2 (I, H), house h(i) is either not among k's top two houses under R k or h(i) is k's second best house under R k and i and k have different best houses under R. In the first case, by the definition of π, k receives at least his third best house under R k and cannot improve by reporting R k instead of R k . In the second case, if h(i) is agent k's second best house under R k and agents i and k have different best houses under R, then by the definition of π, agent k obtains his best house or second best house under R k at φ(I, H, R) = ϕ π (I, H, R). Thus, also in this case agent k cannot benefit from reporting R k instead of R k .
Rule φ is Consistent. Consider a problem (I, H, R) and its reduced problem (I , H , R ).
If R ∈ R 2 (I, H), then either R ∈ R 2 (I , H ) or we have π I = π I (recall that at R agent k obtains house h(i) and he cannot leave with it while agent i remains). Thus, φ(I, H, R) = ϕ π (I, H, R) and φ(I , H , R ) = ϕ π (I , H , R ). Since π is acyclic, consistency of ϕ π follows from Theorem 1.
If R ∈ R 1 (I, H), then either R ∈ R 1 (I , H ) or π I = π I (this latter case only occurs when agent j leaves). However, now π has cycles, involving h(i), a vacant house h, and agents i, j, and k. The only case where such a cycle might cause a problem is if in a problem (I, H, R) agent i trades a vacant house h for his endowment h(i) with agent j, so i obtains vacant house h and j obtains house h(i). In this case, if we remove agent i with his allotment h, then for the reduced problem h(i) becomes a vacant house and agent k has a higher priority than agent j for house h(i). However, since R ∈ R 1 (I, H), agent k ranks neither h(i) as best at R nor h as best and h(i) as second best. Hence, h(i) is not a best house for agent k at R . So, in the reduced problem agents j and k both obtain their best houses, which are different (and agent j obtains h(i)). The other cases can be handled as in the acyclic case because the cycle in priorities π does not cause any "consistency problem" (since it is not active when trading).
Rule φ is not Reallocation-Proof. We consider (I, H, R) with I = {i, j, k}, {h, h(i)} ⊆ H, H O = {h(i)}, and the following preferences:
We now show that agents i and k by changing their preferences from (R i , R k ) at R to ( R i , R k ) at R cause a violation of reallocation-proofness.
Consider agent i changing his preferences at R from R i to R i . For the resulting preference profile
Hence, agent i does not change his allotment by unilaterally moving from R to R 1 .
Consider agent k changing his preferences at R from R k to R k . For the resulting preference profile
Hence, agent k does not change his allotment by unilaterally moving from R to R 2 .
Finally, consider both agents i and k changing their preferences at the same time, moving from R to R, and then swapping their allotments. Then, agent i receives the same allotment φ k (I, H, R) = h(i) = φ i (I, H, R) while agent k is better off receiving φ i (I, H, R) = h P k h 0 = φ k (I, H, R); a contradiction to reallocation-proofness.
Rule φ is Bossy. We consider (I, H, R) with I = {i, j, k}, {h, h , h(i)} ⊆ H, H O = {h(i)}, and the following preferences:
Consider agent k changing his preferences at R from R k to R k . For the resulting preference profile R = (R i , R j , R k ) we have φ k (I, H, R ) = h(i) = φ k (I, H, R), i.e., agent k does not change his allotment by unilaterally moving from R to R . However, the allotments of agents i and j change when agent k unilaterally moves from R to R , i.e., φ i (I, H, R) = h = h = φ i (I, H, R ) and φ j (I, H, R) = h = h = φ j (I, H, R ). Hence, the rule φ is bossy.
B Proofs of Section 4.1 Lemmata
Proof of Lemma 1 (Maximal Conflict Preference Profile Independence). Let R h andR h be different versions of a maximal conflict preference profile for h and π h andπ h be the corresponding priority rankings obtained. We show that for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |I|} we have π h (i) =π h (i). We proceed by induction on i.
Induction Basis. Let i = 1 and suppose
). First, consider the reduced problem (I, H, R) of (I, H, R h ) where
By consistency, φ π h (1) (I, H, R) = h. Second, consider the reduced problem (I, H,R) of (I, H,R h ) where I and H are defined as before andR = (R h )
Third, starting from (I, H, R), change agent π h (1)'s preferences toR π h (1) . By strategy-proofness, φ π h (1) (I, H, (R π h (1) , Rπh (1) )) = h.
By individual-rationality, φπh (1) (I, H, (R π h (1) , Rπh (1) )) = h(π h (1)). Fourth, starting from (I, H, (R π h (1) , Rπh (1) )) change agentπ h (1)'s preferences toRπh (1) . This change results in preference profileR. By strategy-proofness, φπh (1) (I, H,R) = h(π h (1)). By Pareto-optimality, φ π h (1) (I, H,R) = h; contradicting φπh (1) (I, H,R) = h.
Induction Hypothesis. We assume that for each i ≤ i < |I| we have π h (i ) =π h (i ).
Induction
Step. We show that π h (i + 1) =π
Consider the problem (I, H, R 
Second, consider the reduced problem (I , H ,R) of (Ī, H,R h I
) where I and H are defined as before andR = (R h ) H I . By consistency, φπh (i+1) (I , H ,R) = h. An analog argument as for the induction basis shows that when changing preferences step by step from R toR, Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, and strategy-proofness imply that φ π h (i+1) (I, H,R) = h; contradicting φπh (i+1) (I, H,R) = h.
Proof of Lemma 2 (Consistent Reduction of Maximal Conflict Preference Profiles).
Let i, j ∈ I be two different agents and house h ∈ H and problem (I, H, R) be such that I = {i, j}, {h, h(i), h(j)} ⊆ H ∪ {h 0 }, and R ∈ R(I, H) is a maximal conflict preference profile for h restricted to I and H. We show that π h (i) < π h (j) implies φ i (I, H, R) = h and φ j (I, H, R) = h(j).
Recall that π h is generated by a maximal conflict preference profile for h. By Lemma 1, it is no loss of generality to assume that this maximal conflict preference profile is a preference profile R h ∈ R(I, H) such that R is its restriction to I and H, i.e., (R h ) H I = R. By our construction to calibrate π h , there exists a set of agents I := I \ {π h (1), . . . , π h (l)} such that i, j ∈ I, agent i has the highest priority for house h in I, i.e., π h (l + 1) = i, and
Note that (I, H, R) is a reduced problem of ( I, H, R ) and φ j (I, H, R) = φ j ( I, H, R h I ). Hence, φ i (I, H, R) = h and φ j (I, H, R) = h(j).
Proof of Lemma 3 (Acyclicity for Vacant Houses). Let i, j, k ∈ I be three different agents and assume that houses h, h ∈ H are not owned by any of them, i.e., h, h ∈
Assume for the sake of contradiction that π
Consider the problem (I, H, R) where I = {i, j, k}, H ∪ {h 0 } = {h, h , h(i), h(j), h(k), h 0 }, and preferences are such that
• R j : h P j h(j) P j . . ., and
By Pareto-optimality and individual-rationality, either φ i (I, H, R) = h or φ k (I, H, R) = h . Case 1. φ i (I, H, R) = h . By Pareto-optimality, either φ j (I, H, R) = h or φ k (I, H, R) = h. Case 1.1. If φ j (I, H, R) = h, then consider the reduced problem (I , H , R By Pareto-optimality and individual-rationality, either
• R j : h P j h(j) P k . . ., and
2 ) = h and φ j (I, H, R 2 ) = h(j). We now show that agents i and j by changing their preferences from ( R i , R j ) at R 2 to (R i , R j ) at R 1 cause a violation of reallocationproofness.
25
Consider agent i changing his preferences at R 2 from R i to R i . The resulting preference profile R 3 = (R i , R j , R k ) is the restriction of a maximal conflict preference profile for h to I and H and Lemmata 1 and 2 together with π
Hence, agent i does not change his allotment by unilaterally moving from R 2 to R 3 . Consider agent j changing his preferences at R 2 from R j to R j . The resulting preference profile is R 4 = ( R i , R j , R k ). By individual-rationality, φ i (I, H, R 4 ) = h(i). Hence, by individual-rationality, φ j (I, H, R 4 ) = h(j). Hence, agent j does not change his allotment by unilaterally moving from R 2 to R 4 . Finally, consider both agents i and j changing their preferences at the same time, moving from R 2 to R 1 , and then swapping their allotments. Then, agent i receives the same allotment φ j (I, H, R 1 ) = h(i) = φ i (I, H, R 2 ) while agent j is better off receiving φ i (I, H, R 1 ) = h P j h(j) = φ j (I, H, R 2 ); a contradiction to reallocation-proofness.
a smallest problem in terms of the number of agents such that the priority of a top ranked agent at a vacant house is violated, i.e., such that there is an agent i ∈ I and a vacant house h ∈ H V with π . Thus, φ j 1 (I, H, R 1 ) = h. By individual-rationality, φ i (I, H, R 1 ) = h(i). Since (I, H, R) is a smallest problem with a top priority violation for a vacant house, consistency implies that there are different agents j 1 , . . . , j K (possibly K = 1) such that I = {i, j 1 , . . . , j K }, and φ j 1 (I, H,
, by consistency, we could reduce the problem and obtain a problem with fewer agents and a top priority violation at a vacant house). Case 1. K = 1 and I = {i, j 1 }. Recall that agents i and j 1 have maximal conflict preferences for h restricted to H, i.e., R 1 is a maximal conflict preference profile for h restricted to I and H. Hence, by Lemma 2, φ i (I, H, R 1 ) = h; a contradiction.
ces (and renaming agents if necessary) until we reach a preference profile R K with R
by moving h(j 1 ) between the best house h and the second best house h(i), i.e.,
, then by individual-rationality and Pareto-optimality,
. Now, consider the reduced problem where agents j 2 , . . . , j K leave with their allotments that are the houses they occupy, i.e., I = {i, j 1 } and
. But then that reduced problem is a problem with fewer agents than problem (I, H, R) with a top priority violation at a vacant house; a contradiction.
Hence,
and by individual-rationality and Pareto-optimality,
then by acyclicity (Lemmata 3 and 4)
contradicting that agent i has the top priority for house h, i.e., π
and agent i has the second highest priority for h(j 1 ) (after agent j 1 who has the highest priority). Now, consider the reduced problem where agents j 1 leaves with his allotment house h, i.e., I = I \ {j 1 } and H = H \ {h} (note that now h(j 1 ) ∈ H V ). By consistency,
. Furthermore, agent i now has the top priority for h(j 1 ).
However, this is now a problem with fewer agents than problem (I, H, R) with a top priority violation at a vacant house.
C Proofs of Section 4.2 Lemmata
Throughout this section we use that strategy-proofness and non-bossiness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness.
Proof of Lemma 6 (Broker* Lemma). Let i, j, k ∈ I be three different agents and assume that house h ∈ H is not owned by any of them, i.e., h ∈ {h(i), h(j), h(k)}. We show
, then under rule φ, agent j brokers* house h at each pair (I, H) with I = {i, j, k} and h ∈ H.
Let I = {i, j, k}, H ⊆ H with {h, h(i), h(j), h(k)} ⊆ H ∪ {h 0 }, and R ∈ R(I, H) such that each agent ranks h top. We show that φ j (I, H, R) is j's second ranked house.
Step 1. Let preferences R ∈ R(I, H) be such that
We show that agent j gets his second best house, φ j (I, H, R ) = h(i).
Suppose not. Then, by individual rationality,
In the first case, consider the reduced problem (I 0 , H 0 , R 0 ) of (I, H, R ) where agent i leaves with his allotment h, i.e., I 0 = {j, k}, H 0 := H \ {h} (with h(i) ∈ H 0 V ), and
k ) is a maximal conflict preference profile for h(i) restricted to I 0 and H 0 . By
Thus, by Lemma 2, we have a contradiction.
In the second case, 
. Thus, by Lemma 2, we have a contradiction.
Thus, we may assume that φ k (I, H, R ) = h. Now, suppose that agent k changes his preferences from
2 ) = h(j). Consider the reduced problem (I 3 , H 3 , R 3 ) of (I, H, R 2 ) where agent i leaves with his allotment h, i.e., I 3 = {j, k},
. Note however that R 3 is a maximal conflict preference profile for h(i) (restricted to I 3 and H 3 ) and that π h(i) (j) < π h(i) (k). Thus, by Lemma 2, we have a contradiction.
We have now shown that φ j (I, H, R ) = h(i). By individual-rationality, φ i (I, H, R ) = h.
Step 2. Let preferences R ∈ R(I, H) be such that all three agents rank h top and agent j ranks h(i) second. By group strategy-proofness (for i and j), the result that φ i (I, H, R ) = h and φ j (I, H, R ) = h(i) for a profile R as in Step 1 implies that φ i (I, H, R ) = h and φ j (I, H, R ) = h(i).
Step 3. Next we consider the general case of a profile R ∈ R(I, H) at which all three agents rank h top, but agent j does not necessarily rank h(i) second.
If φ j (I, H, R) = h, then by strategy-proofness agent j would also obtain h if R j is replaced by a profile R j where j ranks h top and h(i) second; this would contradict Step 2 which shows that j then obtains h(i). Hence, φ j (I, H, R) = h and Pareto-optimality implies that either φ j (I, H, R) is j's second ranked or third ranked house. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, φ j (I, H, R) is j's third ranked house and denote by h ∈ H \ {h} his second ranked house (note that h = h(i) by Step 2).
First, consider preferences R j ∈ R(j, H) such that
Then, by
Step 2,
Second, consider preferences R j ∈ R(j, H) such that
By Lemma 6, under rule φ, agent j brokers* house h at pair (I, H) and hence φ j (I, H, R) = h(i). Then, by individual rationality, we have φ i (I, H, R) = h and φ k (I, H, R) = h(k). 
Thus, by Lemma 2, we have a contradiction. Hence, we have
Next we show that agent j is an applicant. Suppose not. Then, j is a tenant and h(j) = h 0 . Consider the problem (I, H, R) with I = {i, j, k}, H V := {h}, and R ∈ R(I, H) such that
By Lemma 6, under rule φ, agent j brokers* house h at pair (I, H) and hence φ j (I, H, R) = h(j). Consider the reduced problem (I 2 , H 2 , R 2 ) of (I, H, R) where agent j leaves with his allotment h(j). Note that R 2 is a maximal conflict preference profile for h restricted to I 2 and H 2 . As π h (k) < π h (i), Lemma 2 implies that φ k (I 2 , H 2 , R 2 ) = h. Thus, by consistency, φ k (I, H, R) = h and by individual-rationality, φ i (I, H, R) = h(i). Now consider R ∈ R(I, H) with
• R j = R j : h P j h(j) P j . . .,
By strategy-proofness, φ k (I, H, R ) ∈ {h, h(j)}. If φ k (I, H, R ) = h, then by individualrationality, φ(I, H, R) = φ(I, H, R ), contradicting Pareto-optimality. Hence, φ k (I, H, R ) = h(j) and by individual-rationality, φ i (I, H, R ) = h(i) and φ j (I, H, R ) = h. Now consider R ∈ R(I, H) with
• R j : h P j h(i) P j h(j) P j . . .,
• R k : h P k h(j) P k h(k) P k . . ..
By Lemma 6, under rule φ, agent j brokers* house h at pair (I, H) and hence φ j (I, H, R) = h(i). By individual-rationality and Pareto-optimality this implies φ i (I, H, R) = h and Next, consider the case that φ i (I, H, R 1 ) = h. Then, by Pareto-optimality, we have φ j (I, H, R 1 ) = h(i). Now consider preference profile R 3 ∈ R(I, H) such that
• R 3 i : h P i h(i) P i . . ., • R 3 j : h P j h(i) P j h(j) P j . . ., • R 3 k = R k : h P k h(k) P k . . .. By Lemma 6, under rule φ, agent j brokers* house h at pair (I, H). Hence, φ j (I, H, R 3 ) = h(i). Then, by individual-rationality, φ i (I, H, R
3 ) = h . However, φ i (I, H, R 3 ) = h P 1 i h = φ i (I, H, R 1 ) and φ j (I, H, R 3 ) = h(i) = φ j (I, H, R 1 ), a violation of group strategyproofness.
D Independence of Properties in Theorems 2 and 3
For each of the examples introduced to establish independence below we indicate the property of Theorem 2 or 3 it fails (while it satisfies all remaining properties).
Pareto-Optimality. The null rule φ 0 assigns to each tenant his occupied house and to each applicant the null house. Hence, for each problem (I, H, R) and each agent i ∈ I, φ 0 i (I, H, R) = h(i). The null rule φ 0 satisfies individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, nonbossiness, reallocation-proofness, and consistency, but it violates Pareto-optimality.
Individual Rationality (for Tenants). Let π be a priority structure such that for any h, h ∈ H, π h = π h , i.e., every house has the same priority ordering or serial dictatorship ordering. The serial dictatorship rule ϕ π now works as follows. For each problem (I, H, R), the highest serial dictatorship priority agent in I, let's say agent i, is assigned his best house in H ∪ {h 0 }, the highest serial dictatorship priority agent in I \ {i}, let's say agent j, is assigned his best house in (H \ {ϕ π i (I, H, R)}) ∪ {h 0 }, and so on. The serial dictatorship rule ϕ π satisfies Pareto-optimality, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, reallocation-proofness, and consistency, but it violates individual-rationality for tenants since the serial dictatorship priority structure is not adapted to the ownership structure.
Strategy-Proofness. Let π be a priority structure such that for any h, h ∈ H, π h = π h , i.e., every house has the same priority ordering or serial dictatorship ordering. Furthermore assume that all tenants have higher priority than all applicants, i.e., for each house h ∈ H, each tenant i ∈ I T , and each applicant j ∈ I A , π h (i) < π h (j). Let π denote the priority structure obtained from π by adapting it to the ownership structure. Note that at π, again, all tenants have higher priority for all houses than all applicants and π is acyclic.
We define rule φ as follows. For each problem (I, H, R), we first consider the problem consisting of tenants and all houses, i.e., we consider the problem (I T , H, R I T ), and we apply the TTC rule ϕ π , i.e.,
for each i ∈ I T , φ i (I, H, R) = ϕ π i (I T , H, R I T ).
Since the TTC rule ϕ π is used, we have Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategyproofness, non-bossiness, reallocation-proofness, and consistency among tenants.
Next, we apply the immediate acceptance algorithm to determine the matching for the remaining reduced problem (I \ I T , H \ H, R -If the broker is the only agent pointing at the brokered house, then he receives it and we remove both.
-Otherwise, we force the broker to point to his next best house and return to
Step 1(A).
We define I 2 to be the set of remaining agents and H 2 to be the set of remaining houses and, if I 2 = ∅, continue with Step 2. Otherwise we stop.
Step t. Each agent i ∈ I t points to his most preferred house in H t ∪ {h 0 }. Each house h ∈ H t points to the agent in I t who controls it according to c (It,Ht) . The null house h 0 points to each agent in I t .
•
Step t(A). Matching Simple Trading Cycles. We assign to each agent in a simple trading cycle the house he points to and remove all simple trading cycle agents and houses (except the null house).
Step t(B). Forcing the Broker to Downgrade His Pointing. If there are no simple trading cycles in Step t(A), and only then, the algorithm works as follows (otherwise we go to Step t + 1).
-If the broker is the only agent pointing at the brokered house, then he receives it and we remove both.
Step t(A).
We define I t+1 to be the set of remaining agents and H t+1 to be the set of remaining houses and, if I t+1 = ∅, continue with Step t + 1. Otherwise we stop.
Output. The TC-OB algorithm terminates when all agents in I are assigned a house in H ∪ {h 0 }. We denote the house in H ∪ {h 0 } that agent i ∈ I obtains in the TC-OB algorithm by φ c i (I, H, R). The TC-OB rule based on the structure of control rights c, φ c , associates with each problem (I, H, R) the matching determined by the TC-OB algorithm. Note that our definition of the TC-OB algorithm slightly differs from that of Pycia andÜnver (2017, Appendix F) because we accommodated arbitrary rankings of the null house and in Step t(B) force the broker to downgrade his pointing when another agent points to the brokered house and not just an owner. We now give examples of TC-OB rules that are Pareto-optimal, individually-rational, strategy-proof, non-bossy, and consistent for each of our cases.
Example 7 (Case (i)). Consider I = {i, j, k, }, I T = {i, k, }, and H = {h(i), h(k), h( )}. Define the structure of control rights c with one broker as follows. For each pair (I, H) with If I = {j, k}, then k owns h( ) at (I , H ) and thus µ (k) = h( ) and j obtains h 0 which is also his allotment under µ. Case 4(cii). According to R k , agent k ranks h(i) top and we have µ(i) = h( ) and µ(k) = h(i). We consider the cases I = {i, k} and H = {h(i), h(k), h( )} and I = {j, k} and H = {h(i), h(k)}.
If I = {i, k}, then by Pareto-optimality we have µ (i) = h( ) = µ(i) and µ (k) = h(i) = µ(k).
If I = {j, k}, then by Pareto-optimality we have µ (j) = h 0 = µ(j) and µ (k) = h(i) = µ(k).
Example 8 (Case (ii)). Consider I = {i, j, k}, I T = {i, k}, and H = {h(i), h(k), h}. We use the structure of control rights c and the TC-OB rule φ c from Example 7 to construct a rule φ as follows. For any problem (I, H, R) with I ⊆ I , H ⊆ H we let φ (I, H, R) = φ c (I, H, R) with the interpretation that h = h( ). Individual-rationality, Pareto-optimality, groupstrategy-proofness, and consistency of φ follows from the previous analysis of Example 7.
Example 9 (Case (iii)). Consider I = {i, j, k, }, I T = {i, }, and H = {h(i), h( )}. We use the structure of control rights c and the TC-OB rule φ c from Example 7 to construct a rule φ as follows. Recall that I = {i, j, k, }, I T = {i, k, }, and H = {h(i), h(k), h( )}.
First, we map any problem (I , H , R ) ∈ I × H × R(I , H ) into a problem (I, H, R) ∈ I × H × R(I, H) such that I = I , H = H ∪ {h(k)}, and R is such that R H = R , agents i and j and rank h(k) last, and agent k ranks h(k) just above the null house.
Second, we define rule φ such that for each problem (I , H , R ) ∈ I × H × R(I , H ), φ (I , H , R ) = φ c (I, H, R) with the modification that whenever at φ c (I, H, R) agent k received house h(k) he in fact receives the null house.
Individual-rationality, Pareto-optimality, group-strategy-proofness, and consistency of φ all now follow rather immediately from the fact that φ c satisfies these properties.
Example 10 (Case (iv)). Consider I = {i, j, k}, I T = {i}, and H = {h(i), h}. We use the structure of control rights c and the TC-OB rule φ c from Example 9 to construct a rule φ as follows. For any problem (I, H, R) with I ⊆ I , H ⊆ H we let φ (I, H, R) = φ c (I, H, R) with the interpretation that h = h( ). Individual-rationality, Pareto-optimality, group-strategyproofness, and consistency of φ follows from the previous discussion.
Finally, we show that our examples (Examples 7 -10) of TC-OB rules are not equivalent to TTC rules. For Case (i), let I = {i, j, k}, H = H (with H V = {h( )}), and consider the following preferences
• R i : h( ) P i h(i) P i . . .,
• R j : h( ) P j h(i) P j h(k) P j h 0 ,
• R k : h( ) P k h(k) P k . . .,
• R j : h( ) P j h(k) P j h(i) P j h 0 . Let R = (R i , R j , R k ) ∈ R(I, H) and R = (R i , R j , R k ) ∈ R(I, H). Note that at preference profiles R and R the house h( ) is the top-ranked house by all agents in I. Hence, each TTC rule assigns house h( ) to the same agent at profiles R and R . However, the TC-OB rule according to c assigns house h( ) to different agents at profiles R and R , i.e., φ c i (I, H, R) = h( ) and φ c k (I, H, R ) = h( ). Similar examples can easily be constructed for the remaining Cases (ii), (iii), and (iv).
